1. Global context, anchor in Protection of Civilians (PoC) Week theme  

 

Protection of Civilians Week 2026 took place amid a continued global failure to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, with civilians remaining the primary victims of armed conflict. The situation in Lebanon illustrates this protection gap, where repeated cycles of hostilities have continued despite diplomatic efforts to establish a cessation of violence. This article highlights the evolution of the situation in Lebanon, particularly since the November 2024 cessation of hostilities, as a case study of persistent civilian harm and the lack of effective accountability mechanisms. It aims to draw the attention of the Security Council and Member States to the urgent need to ensure compliance with international law and meaningful protection of civilians. 

 

  1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND : The situation in Lebanon  

 

  1. Before the ceasefire (year 2024) 

 

Prior to the November 2024 cessation of hostilities arrangement, UN experts and human rights organizations had already documented serious concerns regarding the conduct of hostilities in Lebanon, particularly attacks affecting civilian infrastructure and essential services. 

 

In October 2024, Israeli airstrikes reportedly struck approximately 30 branches of Al-Qard Al-Hassan, a civilian financial institution providing community-based financial services. UN Special Rapporteur Ben Saul recalled that international humanitarian law protects civilian objects unless they are being used for military purposes, warning that such strikes risk undermining the principle of distinction between civilian and military objects (OHCHR mandate communications; UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights). 

 

Human rights organizations, including CLDH, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, raised concerns that these attacks may have violated international humanitarian law and could amount to unlawful attacks on medical and civilian infrastructure. 

 

This escalation occurred within a broader context of intensified hostilities in 2024, which by October had reportedly resulted in more than 2,400 deaths and the displacement of approximately 1.2 million people, according to available humanitarian reporting (MoPH / UN-aligned estimates cited in humanitarian reporting). 

 

  1. The ceasefire that never held (Nov 2024 - Feb 2026) 

 

The 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities arrangement was established through a joint United States-France diplomatic initiative under the framework of  UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006). It set out commitments including the cessation of hostilities as of 27 November 2024 at 04:00, the redeployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River within 60 days, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from areas south of the Blue Line. While not legally binding as a treaty, it constitutes a formal political commitment aimed at implementing Resolution 1701 (UNSC 1701; US-France diplomatic letter to the Security Council). 

 

Despite this framework, hostilities continued with significant civilian impact. 

 

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported at least 127 civilian deaths, alongside widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure including homes, roads, factories, and reconstruction sites (OHCHR press briefing notes, 2025). One of the deadliest incidents, the Ein El-Hilweh strike near Sidon, killed at least 13 civilians, including 8 children, raising serious concerns under international humanitarian law (OHCHR). 

 

UNIFIL recorded more than 7,500 air violations and nearly 2,500 ground violations north of the Blue Line, describing them as a “total disregard of the ceasefire agreement” (UNIFIL reporting). The Lebanese Ministry of Public Health reported 331 civilian deaths and 945 injuries during the ceasefire period up to October 2025, while OHCHR verified 108 civilian casualties, including 16 children. 

 

UN Special Procedures mandate holders further reported more than 500 airstrikes acknowledged by Israeli authorities, along with repeated strikes affecting civilian infrastructure and essential services. They also noted that over 80,000 people remained displaced, and highlighted continued restrictions on civilian movement, including the occupation of at least five locations in southern Lebanon and physical barriers extending beyond the Blue Line (UN Special Procedures communications, October 2025). 

 

  1. The March-April 2026 escalation 

 

In March 2026, hostilities escalated sharply, resulting in a large-scale humanitarian crisis. 

 

According to Al Jazeera, within the first weeks of renewed fighting, more than 1 million people were displaced, as entire communities fled repeated airstrikes and ground operations. The report highlights widespread destruction of residential areas, transport infrastructure, and essential services, severely limiting humanitarian access and deepening protection risks for civilians (Al Jazeera, 7 April 2026). 

 

Human Rights Watch documented a major escalation in civilian harm, including the 8 April 2026 wave of strikes, during which at least 303 civilians were killed and more than 1,150 injured. HRW also reported the destruction of at least 9 bridges along the Litani River, severely restricting movement and isolating affected communities (HRW, 10 April 2026). 

 

UN OCHA reports that by mid-May 2026, the escalation had resulted in approximately 2,800–2,900 deaths and over 8,700 injuries. It further highlights extensive damage to hospitals, schools, housing, and essential infrastructure, alongside major constraints on humanitarian access and a deterioration of basic services including food, shelter, and medical care (UN OCHA Lebanon).  

 

“At least 2,846 people have been killed and 8,693 others injured since the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah on March 2, said OCHA, citing figures from the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health” ; “Since the start of the escalation, the World Health Organization has recorded 158 attacks on health care, resulting in 108 deaths and 249 injuries”. 1  

 

The UN Secretary-General expressed deep concern over the escalation, noting mass displacement, large-scale civilian casualties, and extensive destruction of civilian infrastructure, and calling for urgent de-escalation and full respect for international humanitarian law (UN SG statement, 14 April 2026). 

 

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS  

 

The situation is governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP I), and customary international humanitarian law, alongside UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), which reinforces obligations relating to the protection of civilians, cessation of hostilities, and respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty. 

 

The conduct described engages fundamental rules of customary and treaty-based IHL, including: 

 

  • Principle of distinction (AP I, Articles 48, 51(2), 52(2)): parties must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives; attacks may only be directed against military objectives. 

  • Prohibition of indiscriminate attacks (AP I, Article 51(4)): including attacks which are not directed at a specific military objective, or which employ methods incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. 

  • Principle of proportionality (AP I, Article 51(5)(b)): prohibiting attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 

  • Precautions in attack (AP I, Article 57): requiring all feasible measures to verify targets, minimize civilian harm, and cancel or suspend attacks where civilian harm would be excessive. 

  • Protection of civilian objects (AP I, Article 52(1)): civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or reprisals. 

  • Protection of medical units and humanitarian personnel (Geneva Convention I, Articles 19–24; Additional Protocol I, Articles 12–15). 

  • Protection of humanitarian relief and civilian infrastructure essential to survival (customary IHL Rules 54, 55, 56; ICRC Customary IHL Study). 

  • Customary prohibitions on collective punishment, forced displacement except under strict conditions (AP I, Article 49), and attacks causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment (AP I, Articles 35 and 55). 

 

The pattern of attacks on densely populated areas, civilian infrastructure, and essential services raises serious concerns under the cumulative application of these rules, particularly the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions, as repeatedly emphasized by OHCHR and UN Special Procedures. 

 

Under Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, all States, including third States, have a legal obligation to ensure respect for IHL, which has been interpreted as requiring States to take positive measures to prevent violations, refrain from encouraging them, and, where possible, to influence parties to comply with IHL. This obligation is particularly relevant in the context of arms transfers, diplomatic engagement, and political support. 

 

IV. CLDH’s RESEARCH WORK 

Based on the violations documented since 2024, we have developed two reports examining Israel’s violations against medical teams and civil defense personnel in Lebanon, which may amount to war crimes. The first report is based on online documentation and includes an in-depth legal analysis as well as a set of recommendations. The second report builds on the first by incorporating interviews conducted with first responders in South Lebanon, thereby providing a more comprehensive and holistic assessment of the violations and their impact. 

As a matter of fact, and based on the data documented, Israeli attacks on medical and civil defense services in Lebanon were recurrent, operationally disruptive, and psychologically deterrent, often occurring during active rescue missions and affecting clearly identifiable protected objects, including marked ambulances and known medical facilities.  

Ultimately, CLDH findings raise serious concerns of violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), notably the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, and implicate international human rights law, including the rights to life and health. 

 

V. RECOMMENDATIONS  

 

To the UN Security Council 

 

  • Adopt a binding resolution demanding full and immediate compliance with the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities arrangement and UNSC Resolution 1701, including an unconditional end to all offensive military operations, airstrikes, ground incursions, and attacks on civilian infrastructure in Lebanon.  

 

  • Establish an independent, impartial, and transparent international fact-finding mission tasked with investigating all alleged violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law committed in Lebanon since October 2023, including attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, refugee camps, schools, healthcare facilities, humanitarian actors, and UNIFIL peacekeepers. As the OHCHR and UN Special Rapporteurs have repeatedly stressed, prompt and independent investigations are indispensable to accountability and to prevent further violations.  

 

  • Refer the situation in Lebanon to appropriate accountability mechanisms, including the International Court of Justice, in light of documented patterns of attacks on densely populated civilian areas raising serious concerns of violations of IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. UN bodies should ensure that documentation meets evidentiary standards required for future domestic and international prosecutions. The Security Council has both the authority and the obligation under the UN Charter to act where international peace and security are at stake and where IHL violations of this magnitude are credibly established. 

 

  • Take immediate steps to strengthen the protection of UNIFIL peacekeepers and ensure full respect for their mandate under UNSC Resolution 1701. Attacks on UN personnel constitute a direct violation of international law and further undermine the already fragile implementation framework in southern Lebanon. 

 

To the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly 

 

  • Leverage relevant UN bodies, including the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, to reinforce compliance with international humanitarian law through resolutions, reporting mandates, and follow-up mechanisms, while integrating the protection of civilians (including medical services, civil defense personnel, and humanitarian workers) across humanitarian, political, and protection-related engagement.  

 

  • Mandate systematic monitoring, documentation, and reporting on all attacks against civilians, civilian infrastructure, and protected persons in Lebanon, including through coordinated reporting to relevant UN bodies to ensure sustained international scrutiny.  

 

To all UN Member States 

 

  • Suspend, refrain from, or terminate any form of military, financial, or political assistance to parties credibly accused of serious violations of IHL, including attacks on civilian populations, medical infrastructure, and civil defence services, where such assistance would risk contributing to or facilitating those violations.  

 

  • Provide immediate, sustained, and needs-based funding for Lebanon's humanitarian response, including full funding of the USD 308 million Flash Appeal, and extend support to reconstruction, livelihoods, and protection programmes for all affected populations.  

 

  • Support urgent mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance operations in contaminated areas of southern Lebanon to enable the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of internally displaced persons. The April 2025 UN News reporting on the Lebanon situation confirmed that UXO contamination remains one of the principal obstacles to civilian return and economic recovery in the south. 

 

  • Support judicial documentation initiatives, including the preservation of evidence in line with international standards, the protection of witnesses, and the maintenance of secure chain-of-custody procedures, to ensure admissibility before international and domestic courts. As noted in the CLDH IHL in-Focus Policy Brief, States should also consider formal engagement with international judicial bodies, including the ICJ, to address violations affecting protected persons and civilian infrastructure. 

 

  • Engage in renewed and sustained diplomatic efforts to ensure full implementation of the 27 November 2024 arrangement in good faith, and to advance a durable political solution capable of preventing renewed hostilities. The Guardian and Reuters reporting of May 2026 confirms that hostilities continued and even escalated in the days following the latest ceasefire extension, underscoring the failure of ad hoc diplomatic management and the need for a structural political settlement anchored in UNSC Resolution 1701. 

 

To the Government of Lebanon 

 

  • Establish a national judicial documentation and investigation mechanism to systematically record, verify, and preserve evidence concerning attacks on medical facilities, ambulances, civil defense services, civilians, and civilian infrastructure, pursuant to Lebanon's obligations under the Geneva Conventions and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Documentation must meet the evidentiary standards required for future domestic and international prosecutions. 

 

  • Ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and accept its jurisdiction for crimes committed on Lebanese territory, thereby strengthening the domestic-international accountability nexus and enhancing legal avenues to investigate and prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law. 

 

  • Deploy Lebanon's official military and security forces in full compliance with the 27 November 2024 arrangement and UNSC Resolution 1701, ensuring effective control over all border crossings and the Southern Litani Area, and cooperating fully with the tripartite Mechanism and UNIFIL to enforce the commitments contained in the cessation of hostilities arrangement. 

 

To Israel 

 

  • Immediately and unconditionally cease all military operations in Lebanon, including airstrikes, ground incursions, and any action inconsistent with the 27 November 2024 arrangement.  

 

  • Withdraw all forces to positions south of the Blue Line in full compliance with the phased withdrawal schedule under the cessation of hostilities arrangement and UNSC Resolution 1701, which required completion within 60 days of the arrangement's entry into force, a deadline that has long since passed. 

 

  • Enable the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of all internally displaced persons to their homes and communities in southern Lebanon and elsewhere and cease all actions that obstruct civilian access to land, property, and essential services. 

 

  • Cooperate fully with UN human rights mechanisms, UNIFIL, the tripartite Mechanism, and any independent international investigation into alleged violations of IHL committed in Lebanon. The OHCHR has noted that Israel has not responded to its communications regarding specific incidents. This non-cooperation is incompatible with Israel's obligations under international law and must end. 

 

  • Halt all strikes on civilian infrastructure, including bridges, hospitals, schools, and residential buildings.  

 

 

V. CONCLUSION  

 

CLDH reaffirms its commitment to documenting violations and amplifying civilian protection concerns in Lebanon. The situation demonstrates a persistent gap between legal obligations and their implementation. Protection of civilians cannot remain declaratory; it requires enforcement, accountability, and political will. Protection of Civilians Week must serve as a reminder that without accountability, ceasefires remain fragile, and civilians remain unprotected. 

 

Sources: 

 

United Nations / OHCHR / UN system 

 

  • OHCHR / UN Human Rights Office, Press briefing notes on civilian casualties in Lebanon since ceasefire (November 2025) 
    https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/ (reported figures on civilian casualties and violations) 

 

Human Rights Organisations (NGOs) 

 

 

Humanitarian & governmental sources 

 

  • Lebanese Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), official casualty and health data (ongoing conflict reporting) 
    https://www.moph.gov.lb 

 

Media (recent, 2025–2026 developments)